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I. INTRODUCTION
Despite a decade of study, economists have been unable to agree
on advertising's impact on concentration. Telser, Ekelund, Gramm, and
Maurice argue that advertising has no effect on concentration. Mann,
2
Henning, and Meehan contend that the two are intimately connected.
The relationship is interesting for two reasons. First, if advertising
increases concentration, one may choose to pass legislation which will
stave off this process. Second, advertising may be responsible for the
observed increases in concentration in consumer goods industries.
This paper presents several new approaches to the advert is ing-
coneentration discussion. It infers a relationship between advertising
and sales for firms of different sizes in an industry. It employs data
which describe theoretical industries at roughly the 5-digit level. It
focuses on changes in concentration rather than levels of concentration.
It suggests an unexplored avenue by which advertising might increase
concentration. Finally, it develops an original test to analyze
advertising's effect on concentration.
II. Problems with Prior Studies
Previous studies of advertising's effect on concentration have
tended to examine the relationship between an industry's advertising-
sales ratio and the industry's concentration ratio. The expectation
of some relationship was based on advertising's ability to create a
product differentiation barrier to entry- -which in turn led to high
concentration.
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There are two problems with these studies. First, there is a
causation question. When one relates levels of concentration to
advertising intensity, one may discover that high concentration is
associated with intensive advertising, and one may infer that product
differentiation is causing high concentration. However, as Greer has
observed, it is possible that advertising rivalry replaces price
competition when industries become concentrated. This would suggest
that the high concentration causes the intensive advertising—not
vice versa.
Second, the data normally used to study advertising and concen-
tration do not conform to the barrier-to-entry argument. If barriers
to entry do cause high concentration in some industries, they undoubt-
edly take a long time to operate. One would not expect concentration
suddenly to jump or fall by large amounts as barriers to entry are
erected or eliminated. For example, if a dominant firm loses a
patent, its market share may erode gradually, but it is unlikely to
change quickly. If intensive advertising does create barriers -to-
entry which in turn cause high concentration, then the relevant measure
of advertising intensity describes the intensity over the life of the
industry; advertising intensity in a recent year is inadequate if one
doesn't also assume that advertising has remained relatively constant
throughout the industry's life. Nevertheless, empirical work has tended
to relate one year's advertising to the industry's concentration. If
a relationship between concentration and advertising were observed in a
given year, it would be likely to run from the more stable variable--
concentration--to the less stable item--advertising . Thus, the nature
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of the variables examined is not conducive to a finding that advertising
causes high concentration.
By analyzing changes in concentration, rather than levels of con-
centration, one can abate both problems. The causation problem would
be reduced because changes in concentration are less likely than levels
of concentration to be the cause of intensive advertising. Similarly,
changes in concentration conform more closely to the barrier-to-entry
argument because a small change in a concentration level might be caused
by an advertising-erected barrier-to-entry.
III. A Different Outlook on the Advertising-Concentration Question
Barriers -to-entry are not the only mechanism that can relate adver-
tising to concentration. This section suggests that advertising may
increase concentration by affecting different size firms' sales
differently. The model considers changes in sales rather than levels
of sales because--as with concentration—dealing with changes reduces
the causation problem.
There are two reasons unequal size firms may have different relation-
ships between advertising ?.nd the change in their sales. First, there
may be declining costs in advertising. If declining costs in advertising
obtain, then large advertisers pay less per unit of advertising than
small advertisers. Advertising, then, constitutes a downward-sloping
component of the average total cost curve. If non-advertising costs are
constant for all outputs, then average total costs will be downward
sloping due to advertising's contribution. In other words, large and
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small firms would be on an equal footing in the absence of advertising;
due to advertising's existence, large firms have a unit cost advantage.
Second, the effectiveness of a firm's advertising may be a positive
function of the firm's size. (This differs from declining costs of
advertising because here we are saying advertising's effectiveness may
depend on the firm's size, while there we were saying it might depend
on the amount the firm advertises.) If the success of a firm's adver-
tising is a positive function of the firm's size, then a dollar of a
large firm's advertising is more effective in increasing sales than
a dollar of a small firm's advertising is. If other factors influencing
growth rates are the same for all size classes of firms, then advertising
will enable large firms to grow at a more rapid rate than small firms,
and concentration will rise.
The success of a firm's advertising may depend on the firm's size
for two reasons. First, large firms are better known than small firms.
Advertising's initial task is to create consumer awareness of a brand's
existence. When a product is part of a large company's brand line,
fostering awareness may be less problematic. The large firm may be able
to direct its advertising toward improving the consumer's attitude
toward the product. The smaller firm- -worrying about awareness as well
as attitude-development--may be at a decided disadvantage.
Large firms' advertising may also be more effective than small
firms' advertising because the large firms' products are more widely
distributed. For example, one finds Good Seasons Salad Dressing at all
super markets, but it is easy to find a store that does not stock Trader
Vic's salad dressing. If one assumes that all firms' advertising is
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equally effective in persuading new customers to ask for the advertiser's
brand first, then all firms will increase their sales in proportion to
their advertising expenditures --providing each firm's product is avail-
able when the customer asks for it. If advertising is not powerful
enough to induce the consumer to try another store, then a brand that
is not carried by every merchandiser will lose some of its potential
customers to its rivals. This firm's advertising will be less effective
than the advertising of the fully-distributed products because of the
difference in availability.
One can test the propositions presented above by contrasting the
effectiveness of large and small firms' advertising. (Throughout this
paper, the term "effectiveness of advertising" refers to advertising's
ability to augment the firm's sales.) If there is a difference in
effectiveness that is related to the amount of advertising the firm
undertakes, then one has evidence of declining costs in advertising.
If large firms have more effective advertising but this advantage is
unrelated to the amount they advertise, then there is evidence that the
large firms' reputations or distribution networks enhance the effective-
ness of their advertising.
One can measure advertising's effectiveness in increasing a firm's
sales by regressing the change in sales on the amount the firm spends
on advertising. To obtain an unbiased estimate of advertising's
effectiveness, one must include in the regression all other variables
that might affect the firm's sales. The most apparent of these are:
'.
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Advertising by the Firm's Rivals --Rivals ' advertising should have two
effects. First, it should increase industry sales with some of
the increase going to the firm we are studying. Second, it should
attract customers from the firm being studied. The second effect
is likely to dominate. Therefore, we expect rivals' advertising
to reduce the firm's sales.
The Firm's Relative Price in the Industry--If advertising attracts new
customers to the industry, more are likely to gravitate toward
lower priced items than higher priced items as long as differences
in price are not equally matched by differences in quality.
Changes in the Firm's Relative Price--If the firm reduces its price
relative to its rivals' prices, its sales should increase at its
rivals' expense.
The Initial Level of the Firm's Sales--If all firms grow by the same
percent due to secular growth in demand, then the firm's sales
in the initial period will measure the base from which its per-
centage growth departs. A larger base implies a larger absolute
change
.
The Stage in the Business Cycle--Grovth in secular demand will affect
all firms' growth rates and will vary with the business cycle.
The Product's Stage in its Life Cycle--Most products seem to experience
a life cycle during which they are introduced, enjoy rapid growth,
experience stable sales, and finally have declining sales. The
firm's change in sales will be affected by its product's current
stage in its life cycle.
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As we shall see, not all these variables have been included in the
regressions reported here. For some variables, data were inadequate.
Others were excluded from the regression because they had no significant
impact on either the dependent variable or the coefficients of the remain-
ing variables. One variable— the business cycle measure--was excluded
because the sample is a cross section of firms rather than a time series.
The stage in the business cycle is the same for all observations. There-
fore, we could not measure how the business cycle affected a firm's sales.
Suffice it to say that results found in this paper are not necessarily
generalizable to other stages in the business cycle. Changes in
aggregate demand may influence the relative growth rates of large and
small firms. If fluctuations in aggregate demand also affect advertising's
impact on sales, then the results found here are only valid for the expan-
sion phase of the cycle covered by the data used here.
IV. Data
The sample employed consisted of 325 firms in 53 consumer-goods
industries. Observations encompassed a company's operations in a given
four- or five-digit industry. Companies were included in the sample
only if either: 1) the company's entire business fell within a single
theoretical industry during the sample period, or 2) adequate breakdowns
of the company's sales and advertising were available by industry during
the sample period. When adequate breakdowns were available for more than
one industry, the company's operation in each of these industries counted
as a separate observation. This procedure is recommended for allocating
diversified companies' operations to industries. It differs from the con-
ventional method of allocating all a company's activities to its primary
industry.
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Advertising data came from Advertising Age and National Advertising
Investments (NAI ) . Advertising Age data cover eight media, while NAI
data only include four media. On the other hand, NAI reports on all
companies that spend over $"".5,000 per year on advertising, while
Advertising Age only covers the top 125 advertisers. Also, NAI breaks
down the companies' advertising by product. Advertising Age has some
breakdowns of most companies' advertising, but often the breakdown is
incomplete.
Faced with two quite distinct types of advertising data, it was
necessary to make some adjustments. One assumption was sufficient--
that for any industry, the ratio of advertising expenditures in the
four NAI media to the eight Advertising Age media is the same for
all firms. Having made this assumption, the ratio of Advertising
Age advertising to NAI advertising was computed for all firms for which
both figures were available. An average ratio was calculated for each
industry. This ratio was then multiplied by the more widely available
NAI figures for other firms in each industry. By this method, NAI
figures were made comparable to the eight media Advertising Age numbers.
Two aspects of the data merit special observation. NAI only breaks
down television advertising by product during the years 1967 and 1968.
In other years, it presents a company's television advertising as an
undivided total, while it subdivides the advertising in other media by
product. Since a breakdown of the firm's advertising is crucial to our
approach to the data, the study was confined to the period 1967-1968.
Second, NAI does not report the advertising of firms that spend less
.•
than $25,000 per year on advertising. One of the variables in our model
is rivals' advertising. To the extent that small firms' advertising is
not reported, this variable will be poorly measured. The error introduced
from this source is unknown but probably minor.
Sales data were compiled from two sources. Advertising Age often
reports companies' sales by product along with its advertising data.
Where these figures were available, they were used. For most other
companies, the company's annual report provided the basis for the sales
breakdowns. In many instances, the breakdown was not available; in these
cases, the company was dropped from the sample— though, its advertising
was retained as part of rival's advertising for other firms in its
industry.
The advertising data were used to form variables measuring both
the firm's own advertising and its rivals' advertising. In preliminary
regressions, two other variables were tried and dropped due to their
having no perceptible influence on either the dependant variable or the
coefficients of the other independent variables. One of these variables
was a dummy representing the product's relative price in the industry.
This dummy was constructed largely on the basis of surveys of consumer
magazines for the prices of durable goods. For food and drugs, which
were not covered by consumer magazines, a survey was conducted in the
Berkeley-Oakland (California) area of 1971 relative prices. A dummy
value of high, medium, or low was assigned on the basis of 1971 prices.
Use of this dummy required the assumption that relative prices are
generally stable within the high, medium, low range covered by the dummies,
''
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The second variable that was dropped from the final regressions was
a dummy for the product's stage in its life cycle. Products were divided
into 1) those that were relatively new during 1967-1968 and, hence, were
in the stages of introduction and growth, or 2) those that had passed the
growth stage and were at the "mature" level of relatively stable sales.
No products in our sample were deemed to be in the still-later stage of
a product's life cycle where the product is passing out of use and where
sales are falling.
Finally, changes in relative price is a variable that is both missing
from the regressions and likely to belong in the equation. One expects
that a product's sales rise when its relative price falls and that its
sales fall when its relative price rises. However, no data were available
on changes in relative price during the sample period. There are two
defenses for proceeding without such an important variable. First, most
of the industries in the sample are oligopolistic. In these industries,
price competition might be expected to be rare, and to be overshadowed
by advertising rivalry. Second, if changes in relative prices are
independent of both the amount and effectiveness of advertising and
independent of the size of the relevant firm, then the absence of this
variable does not affect our test results. While these are stringent
conditions, there are at least no well-established theories relating
changes in relative price to any of these variables.
qTable 1 presents the industries included in the sample. The
industries are divided into four sectors --expensive items, drugs, food,
and household products. The firms in each of these sectors are treated
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separately with a distinct equation fit for each one. To regress the
entire sample together would require assuming that the relationship
between advertising and the change in sales is the same for all firms
in the economy. This is a somewhat implausible assumption. Ideally,
one could fit a separate equation for each firm--or at least each
industry—in the economy. The number of observations required to
obtain good estimates forbade fitting a hyperplane to each firm or
industry. The compromise was to regress each sector separately and,
hence, to assume that the relationship between advertising and the
change in the firm's sales is the same for all firms in similar industries,
V. Test Methods and Test Results
GENERAL SPECIFICATION
Previous sections have suggested that the equation we wish to
estimate is some specification of:
(1) AS t = f(S t . lt A, AO)
where AS
t
= the change in a firm's sales between period t-1 and t
S , = the firm's sales during period t-1
A = the firm's advertising, certainly during period t, and
perhaps also during period t-1, t-2, etc.
AO = the firm's rivals' advertising, also during period t,
and perhaps during periods t-1, t-2, etc.
Several questions remain unanswered about the appropriate form of the
advertising variables. Is it strictly concurrent with the change in
sales? Is the dollar expenditure on advertising the relevant variable?
Or should one instead introduce lagged advertising and perhaps focus on
advertising-sales ratios?
I-
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Given sufficient data, equation (l)'s most general form would include
many lagged advertising terms. Since our advertising data cover only 1967
and 1968, however, only figures for those years could be used. As a
result, the form of equation (1) that was estimated had one current and
one lagged term for both the firm's own and its rivals' advertising.
(The change in sales variable measured 1968 sales minus 1967 sales, and
the initial-period-sales variable measured 1967 sales.)
Three specifications of the advertising variable were tried in
equation (1). These were absolute dollar expenditures on advertising,
the advertising-sales ratio, and the ratio of the firm's advertising
to its rivals' advertising. The advertising-sales ratio expression did
not perform as well as the other two formulations; only results on
absolute advertising expenditures and the ratio of the firm's to its
rivals' advertising will be reported.
The two resulting equations are:
(2) AS t = 80 + 63^ S t _ 1 + B2A t + B3 At , 1 + B4 A0 t + B5 A0t _ l + e?
and
At/ At 1
(3) AS t = 80 + 6! St _ 1 + B2 'AOj. + B3 /AOt -l + e 3
Before either equation was suitable for estimation, heterosceda-
sticity had to be eliminated. It was unlikely that the errors of all
firms in the sample would have uniform variances. More likely, the
variances would vary directly with the firm's size. To correct for
heteroscedasticity, the squares of the residuals in the unadjusted
linear forms of equations (2) and (3) were regressed on each firm's
1967 sales and on various forms of the sales variable. All terms in
''
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the equation were then divided by the square root of the sales variable
form that was most highly correlated with the square of the residuals.
For example, in the expensive-items-sector fitting of equation (2),
the square of the residuals was most highly correlated with the square
root of 1967 sales. Therefore, each variable in equation (2) was
divided by the fourth root of 1967 sales when the expensive-items sector
was tested. This procedure normalized the variables and generated a
homoscedastic sample. The resulting least squares estimates are best
linear unbiased under the normal Gauss -Markov assumptions.
Tables 2 and 3 present estimates of equations (^) and (3) for the
whole sample after the adjustment for heteroscedasticity. The multiple
correlation coefficients are moderately high for cross section studies--
thereby lending support to the contention that the independent variables
help explain changes in the firm's sales.
MULTICOLLINEARITY
In assessing advertising's impact on the change in the firm's
sales, one wishes to estimate how a dollar of advertising changes sales
in the long run. If sales increase by B2 dollars immediately after one
spends a dollar on advertising, if they decrease by B-, dollars during
the following period, and if they remain constant hereafter, then one is
interested in estimating (B2 - Bg)--the net change in sales produced by
a dollar of advertising.
In our equations, multicollinearity inhibits precise estimation
of the relationship between advertising and concurrent changes in sales.
However, collinearity does not impede estimation of (B« - Bo). Current
...
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and lagged advertising are collinear in our sample. These variables are
positively correlated, and their coefficients have opposite signs in our
equations. Under these conditions, it is possible to estimate (B2 - B3)
precisely even though neither EL nor B^ can be estimated precisely by
itself. 10
MARGINAL PRODUCTIVITY TEST
To test whether there are declining costs in advertising, one can
add an advertising-squared term to either the absolute expenditure or
the ratio equation. The presence of the squared term permits a non-
linear relationship between advertising expenditures and the change in
the firm's sales. A positive coefficient on the squared term indicates
that each advertising dollar increases sales by a greater amount when
one advertises intensely than when one advertises lightly. This is the
condition for decreasing costs in advertising. A negative coefficient
on the other hand, indicates that as one advertises heavily, advertising
becomes a less-effective sales builder.
If declining costs in advertising do exist, one should not conclude
that firms are not profit maximizing. When we test for increasing marginal
effectiveness of advertising, we hold rivals' advertising constant. The
benefits from increasing advertising might appear to be positive when
one assumes rivals will not change their advertising budgets while the
true returns are negative because rivals will actually respond by
increasing their advertising.
Tables 4 and 5 present the equations with the advertising-squared
terms after the adjustment for multicollinearity. Table 4 contains the
..
:
•
:
.
-
.
... •.. .
....
...... . :
.......
• '
•
:
-:•.
I
:!.••:'
.
.
.
. 1 . .
•
,
. ,. . ......
.
......
. ..
r.
-
.: i
:~--\
> i
-15-
absolute-advertising results; Table 5 shows the ratio equations. The
inclusion of the squared term for rivals' advertising in Table 4 is
necessary primarily for consistency. If the relationship between the
firm's advertising and changes in its own sales is non-linear, then it
is likely that the relationship between its advertising and change in
its rival's sales is also non-linear. The rivals ' -advertising- squared
variable was formed by summing the squares of each rival's advertising.
The equations in Table 4 indicate declining marginal productivity
of advertising in all four sectors. The signs of the advertising-
squared coefficients are negative in all four sectors, and they differ
significantly from zero at the 5% level in three of the four sectors.
Only in the household sector—where the sign is still negative—does
the coefficient on advertising squared not differ significantly from
zero.
In Table 5, the results are less uniform. In three of the four
sectors, the coefficient is negative but insignificantly different from
zero. In the drug sector, the coefficient is positive, differing
significantly from zero at the ten percent level— though not at the
five percent level.
In assessing the results of the marginal productivity test, it
seems reasonable to combine the readings from both tables. The expensive-
items and food sectors suggest declining marginal productivity quite
strongly, the household sector shows declining marginal productivity more
weakly, and the drug sector yields mixed results.
i
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DIFFERENTIAL EFFECTIVENESS OF ADVERTISING
The marginal productivity test indicates whether, at the margin,
large advertisers have more or less effective advertising than small
advertisers. Section III suggested that large firms' advertising might
be more effective than small firms' advertising regardless of the quanti-
ties of advertising. In other words, due to a wider reputation or more
thorough distribution network, a large firm's advertising may be more
effective than its smaller rival's advertising even if the large firm
has a lower advertising budget.
When the sample is divided into large- and small-firm subsamples,
a Chow test on the advertising coefficients indicates whether large
firms' advertising is more or less effective than small firms' adver-
tising. The Chow test is performed on the equations with the squared
terms included to allow for non-linearities within each size class.
The test consists of ascertaining whether one can reject the joint
hypothesis that large and small firms have the same coefficients on
all the advertising variables in the ratio equation and on all the non-
rival advertising variables in the absolute-expenditure equation.
The Chow test does not itself distinguish the cause of differential
effectiveness between large and small firms' advertising; it only shows
whether differential effectiveness exists. In particular, the Chow
test does not tell whether it is large firms' size or their tendency
to advertise more than small firms that makes their advertising more
or less effective. But if the Chow test indicates that large firms'
advertising is more effective, and if the squared-term test fails to
.I
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indicate increasing marginal effectiveness of advertising, then one can
infer that it is factors associated with the firm's size--such as better
distribution or a wider reputation--that influence advertising's effective-
ness .
Tables 6 and 7 present the equations on which the Chow test were
performed. A comparison of large and small firms' coefficients in
Table 6 reveals that the impact of small firms' advertising is greater
in the expensive-items, drug, and household sector, but that large firms'
12
advertising is more effective in the food sector. " In none of the four
sectors is the difference in coefficients significant, however.
The advertising-ratio equations for large and small firms are shown
in Table 7. Again the Chow tests fail to indicate a significant dif-
ference between the coefficients of large and small firms. Although the
Chow Test is not significant for any of the four sectors, advertising
has a greater impact on small firms' sales than on large firms' sales
in all four sectors. If we accept as our null hypothesis that
advertising increases concentration, then large firms should have
greater advertising coefficients than small firms in all four sectors.
Table 7 presents four independent repetitions of an experiment in which
the coefficients on large and small firms' advertising are compared.
The probability of small firms having larger coefficients in all four
cases is one in sixteen if we assume fifty-fifty odds that the inequality
go either way. If we adopt the advertising-causes-concentration position,
the odds on small firms having the larger coefficient are less than fifty-
fifty. Thus the odds on four successive instances of small firms having
I'
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the larger coefficient are less than one in sixteen. Being conservative,
we can reject at the ten percent level— though not at the five percent
level--the hypothesis that large firms' advertising is more effective.
In Tables 6 and 7, most of the coefficients on the squared terms
are insignificant. This suggests that the relationship between adver-
tising and the change in the firm's sales may be linear in advertising
within each size class. Tables 8 and 9 present the equations for large
and small firms when the equations are constrained in linearity.
Although none of the Chow tests on the absolute-expenditure
equations in Table 8 indicates a significant difference between the
coefficients, small firms' coefficients are larger than large firms'
coefficients in all four sectors. The Chow tests form four independent
repetitions of an experiment comparing the coefficients of large and
small firms' advertising. The repetitions all show that small firms'
advertising is more effective than large firms' advertising. There-
fore, one can reject at the ten percent level the hypothesis that large
firms have more effective advertising. One can accept the alternative
hypothesis that small firms' advertising is either equally effective
or more effective than large firms' advertising.
In Table 9, there is, again, no significant difference between
the coefficients for any sector. Again, small firms have larger
coefficients than large firms in all four sectors. In the food sector,
large firms' advertising appears to reduce sales. Fortunately, this implau-
sible coefficient does not differ significantly from zero. Again one can
'I
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reject at the ten percent level the hypothesis that large firms' adver-
tising is more effective.
In summary, the Chow tests fail to support the hypothesis that
differential effectiveness of large and small firms' advertising is
the method by which advertising increases concentration. On the
contrary, the Chow tests suggest that small firms' advertising is at
least as effective as large firms' advertising. This implies that
advertising does not increase concentration and may even reduce it.
RIVALS' ADVERTISING
Both the marginal productivity tests and the Chow tests discussed
above deal with the firm's own advertising. It is possible that large
and small firms grow at different rates because rivals' advertising
effects them differently. In particular, small firms' growth rates
may be stunted more by rivals' advertising than are large firms' growth
rates because, on average, small firms have larger rivals, and therefore
more rivals' advertising, ttforking against them.
A linear specification of the relationship between advertising and
changes in the firm's sales implies that large firms grow more rapidly
than small firms when all firms have equally effective advertising and
spend the same percent of their sales dollars on advertising. Equation (A)
is a linear specification of the relationship; equation (5) shows the
percentage growth in sales.
'I
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(4) AS
fc
= BQ S t „ 1 +B X A+ B2AQ
(5) AS
t
= B + B, A/_ + B_ A0
S t-1 ° i /s t-i ?- ^
If all firms have the same advertising-sale;, ratios and equally effective
advertising, then only the last term in equation (5) varies across firms.
For small firms, the numerator of the last term will be large and the
denominator will be small. Since E9 ' s expected sign is negative, small
firms' growth will suffer more than large firms' growth as a result of
their respective rivals' advertising.
By allowing equation (4) to deviate from linearity, we can test
whether the relative quantities of rivals' advertising give large firms
an advantage over small firms. We begin with a generalised form of
equation (4) and estimate one parameter by maximum likelihood. The
general form of equation (4) is:
(6) AS
fc
C
= B
x
S
(
._ 1
+ B
2
A + B
3
A0
The inclusion of K can neutralize, augment, or reverse the effect of
the rivals' advertising variable. In each sector, a different value
of K corresponds to large and small irms growing at equal rates. Let
— 13 —
us call this value K. K is lowest in the food sector, near 1.03,
and highest in the expensive-items sector, near 1.10. In both the
drug and household sectors the value is near 1.04.
We test whether rivals' advertising hurts small firms more than
14large firms by finding a maximum likelihood estimate for K. If K
is less than K, then small firms grow less rapidly than large firms
due to the greater amount of their rivals' advertising. For values
I'
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of K greater than K, small firms grow more rapidly than large firms
despite the effect of rivals' advertising.
In actually performing the test, the maximum likelihood estimate
2
of K turns out to be the value of K that maximizes R . The variance of
-6
X
the estimate of K is small (of magnitude 10 ) when this procedure is
used. Thus, one can obtain reasonably precise estimates of K by
interating over small enough intervals. Although the maximum likelihood
estimate of K is very precise, the equal-growth-rate value K, with which
16
it is compared, is not measured very precisely. Thus, the comparison
of K with the maximum likelihood estimate is not an exceedingly powerful
test.
Maximum likelihood estimates of K for the four sectors are presented
in Table 10. There is remarkable uniformity of the estimates for the
drug, food, and household sectors given that the estimate for the
expensive-items sector is quite different. Table 10 also presents the
values of K for each sector as well as a zone of ignorance around K
and a confidence interval around the raaximul likelihood estimate.
The estimate for the expensive items sector indicates that small
firms grow more rapidly than large firms in this sector. All estimates
for the other sectors suggest that rivals' advertising produces no
difference between the growth rates of large versus small firms.
None of the tests discussed in this section supports the conten-
tion that large firms obtain an advantage over small firms as a result
of advertising. There does not appear to be a difference in effective-
ness between large and small firms' advertising either as a result of
•
declining costs in advertising or some size-related factors. Also, the
effect of rivals 1 advertising does not appear to be more detrimental to
small firms' growth than to large firms' growth. Despite the seemingly
reasonable conjectures in Section III, this paper has presented no
evidence that advertising increases concentration.
VI. Summary and Conclusions
This paper has pointed out weaknesses in the previous research on
advertising and concentration, and it has offered a new hypothesis
explaining how advertising might increase concentration. Several con-
ventional tests of the hypothesis were performed. One original test
was developed to ascertain whether rivals' advertising may retard small
firms' growth more than large firms' growth. The results of these tests
failed to support the contention that advertising increases concentra-
tion. Most of the test results indicated no difference in effectiveness
between large and small firms' advertising. Where there was a difference,
the results suggested that small firms' advertising was likely to be more
effective than large firms' advertising. If this finding is valid,
advertising may enable small firms to grow more rapidly than large firms
and may actually be a deconcentrating force.
These results leave two perplexing questions: what causes the
high levels of concentration in many consumer-goods industries, and
what has caused concentration to rise in relatively unconcentrated
industries? The tests in this paper suggest that advertising is not
responsible. Following many writers' precedent, I recommend these
questions for further study.
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3
The increase in concentration in consumer-goods industries is documented
in Willard F. Mueller, A Primer on Monopoly and Competition
,
Random House,
New York, 1970, pp. 29-38. Mueller attributes increase to extensive adver-
tising and promotion since World War II. T ni
4
In particular, Telser, Ekelund, Gramm, Maurice, Mann, Henning, and
Meehan all regress concentration ratios on advertising-sales ratios for
cross-sections of three-or four-digit industries. Ekelund and Gramm and
Ekelund and Maurice try the relationship in its first difference form also.
Douglas Greer, "Advertising and Market Concentration," Southern Eco-
nomic Journal
, 38, No. 1, July, 1971, pp. 19-32.
c
In theory, declining costs in advertising may stem from either of two
sources. First, the cost of an advertising message may decline as one buys
more messages. Second, the effectiveness of each message may decline as one
advertises more. For «xairiple, if consumers have threshholds which must be
crossed before they re.spond to a firm's advertising, or if they merely res-
pond increasingly favorably as they have contact with more of a firm's ad-
vertising, then the more a firm advertises the lower will be the cost of
increasing sales by onu more unit. Blank and Peterman, independently, have
shown that media do not give discounts to large advertisers. (See David
M. Blank, "Television Advertising: The Great Discount Illusion, or Long-
pardy Revisited," Journal of Busines s, 41, No. 1, Jan., 1969, pp. 10-38,
and John L. Peterman, "The Clorox Case and the Television Rate Structures,"
Journal of Law and Economics
,
XI, No. 2 October, 1969, pp. 321-422.) This
eliminates the first possibility. In the following sections, we discuss
and test the second possibility.
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The procedure employed was suitable for this study on sales and
advertising because figures on sales and advertising breakdowns are less
scarce than are data on other aspects of a firm's behavior. If the Federal
Trade Commision succeeds in requiring the reporting of detailed breakdowns
of companies' activities, this method will be available for a wider range
of studies.
o
The rivals' advertising variable was formed by summing the adver-
tising of all other firms in the relevant four-or five-digit industry.
Geographic adjustments were made in the petroleum, airline, beer, and
dairy industries so that only the appropriate portion of a national rival's
advertising was included in the rivals ' advertising variable for a regional
firm. Two alternative formulations of the rivals' advertising variable
performed no better than the sum of all rivals' advertising. These al-
ternatives were the advertising of only large rivals and the advertising
of only rivals of comparable size to the firm under observation.
9Table 1 presents only one of many possible ways to group industries.
To see whether the results of the study change dramatically when the indus-
tries are regrouped, one other classifying system was tried. Industries
were divided into either a) necessities and convenience goods, or b) shopping
goods and specialty items. The former class includes items that are bought
frequently and where habit is presumed to strongly influence brand choice.
The latter group includes items that are bought less frequently. Shopping
goods are commodities whose prices the consumer studies carefully. Spe-
cialty items are those for which he has been convinced to buy a particular
bran?t before he goes shopping. While the particular numbers change if one
uses this alternative industry classification scheme, the fundamental
results remain the same.
Collinearity never affects the estimation of one linear combination
of the collinear variables. If X and Y are the collinear variables, and
if X = Ky + e, then collinearity does not effect the estimate of the co-
efficient on X - Ky (assuming the coefficients on X and Y have opposite
signs in the equation). In our case, K is near one. Across firms, current
and lagged advertising move together collar for dollar. Therefore, we can
estimate (B - B~) precisely.
11
There are at least two bases for dividing the sample—size and mar-
ket share. The results reported here refer to divisions on the basis of
firm size. Interestingly, employing the market share division did not
change the test results— though it affected the coefficient values. The
results from the sales division are reported here because differences in
firms' reputations and distribution networks are more likely to be associa-
ted with absolute than relative size.
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To compare the effectiveness of small and large firms' advertising,
we wish to combine the squared and unsquared components. The two effects
are combined for each size class by multiplying each coefficient by the
average value of the corresponding variable and then summing the products.
This procedure yields advertising's expected impact on sales for each size
class.
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To calculate the value K that c
large and small firms, we first divide
We then find the predictc . "or eac
the B's are the same for the two size
the independent variables within each
procedure is followed, large firms' pr
cause the large firms are affected
Wex therefore _deflate the predicted AS
1/K, choosing K so that:
orresponds to equal growth rates for
our sample into large and small firms,
h size class under the assumption that
classes; we use the average values of
size class to predict AS . When this
edicted growth rates are larger be-
s negatively by rivals' advertising,
for both large and small firms by
-1)
where
:
AS. - predicted change in sales for large firms between periods
t-1 and t;
AS = predicted change in sales for small firms between periods
t-1 and t;
S- , .. » = average sales of large firms during period t-1.
S ,
,
.
= average sales of small firms during period t-1.
s \,t X.)
Choosing K in this manner offsets the effect of small firms having more
rivals' advertising to contend with. When we adjust the dependent variable
by K, our equation predicts that all firms grow at the same rate.
14
It is common practice to adjust the dependent variable by K when one
does not expect a linear relationship. See Robert Masson, Executive Com-
pensation and Firm Performance, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University
of California, 1969, pp. 91,92. The procedure suggested here takes the
further step of finding a maximum likelihood estimate of K rather than
assuming a value and imposing it on the data.
15
log(
The maximum likelihood estimate is obtained by maximizing
n
, k m 9
,
(AS .-.L-.B..X..)1=1 t:. 3 = 1 ji ji
2iro
2,n/2 -)
2a' , or equivalently
- |log (2-o-
)
m
- ]
la' i=l
(AS ' - E B..X..) , with respect to K
ti j=l 31 31'
and the B's. When one maximizes
m
-
--log (2 •;:• ) - 1 .1. ( ,^1
Ya7 ti j=l ji ji ; , the first term drops out,

n , m 2
and one is left minimizing i=l ti j=l ji ji . This is just the sum
of squared residuals of the regression. Finding the B's that maximize
R for a given K is equivalent to minimizing the sum of squared residuals
for that K. When one iterates K and finds the K that yields the highest
R^, one finds the minimum of the sums of squared residuals.
The asymptotic variance of the maximum likelihood estimate equals
E(l!iaL4&Bi.)'\ where f(K,B)= 19
dUT 2 n/2
(2TT0)
m n
_ ? (AS^-AW
e i=l
2a z
Taking second partial derivatives yields:
Var(mLE) =
£
2
^AS^WCAS^) [2 AS*
±
- J^X..]
The zone of ignorance around K exists because the estimate of K
is sensitive to changes in the dividing line between large and small firms.
To find the zone of ignorance, we change the dividing line by fifty percent
in either_ direction. We then recalculate K. When the dividing line is
raised, K drops; when the dividing line is reduced, K rises. JEt is unlikely
that the equal-growth value of K exactly equals the value of K for any
sector in Table 10. However, it is very likely that_the equal-growth
value of K lies within the zone of ignorance around K in all sectors.
17
Joe S. Bain, "Changes in Concentration in Manufacturing Industries
in the United States, rends and Relations to the Levels of
1954 Concentration," Review of Economics ana Statistics
,
LI I, No. 4, Nov.,
1970, pp. 411-416.
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